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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Syndication is a major factor in the market for television programming.  These 
papers analyze the effects of the off-network syndication market on prime time 
programming decisions that are made by broadcast networks.  The first paper investigates 
the effects of the off-network syndication (rerun) market on the optimal number of 
seasons for a prime time television series.  The theoretical model predicts that syndication 
could potentially either increase the number of seasons if the price elasticity of demand 
for syndication is elastic or vice versa.  The empirical analysis consists of a duration 
model and estimates the effects of first run ratings and syndication on the probability that 
the show will not be cancelled in that season.  The second paper proposes that the 
removal of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in 1995 changed the incentives 
for the networks to air more reality programming even if these programs are less popular 
and receive lower ratings than dramatic programs.  This hypothesis is evaluated using a 
model borrowed from Wildman and Robinson (1995), a profit maximization model as 
well as a stock and flow model to help explain the timing of the shift.  A simple t-test 
does show that the average amount of reality programming is significantly different (and 
higher) after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked.  In addition, the regression analysis 
indicates that there is a shift in the number of seasons that the average syndicated 
program is aired during the first run. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TO CANCEL OR NOT TO CANCEL: 
SYNDICATION AND THE OPTIMAL LENTGH OF A PROGRAM 
Introduction 
The television industry is a complex and dynamic world, involving many players.  
Networks interact with producers, advertisers and local stations to entertain, inform, and 
educate people in a modern world.  Diverse television content can be found 24 hours a 
day on an ever growing number of channels. Each time period and channel has different 
goals and therefore, different content.  Because of the complexity of the overall market, 
the focus here is narrowed to programming on the major broadcast networks during the 
time period referred to as prime time
1
 and the possibility of those programs to be 
syndicated on local stations outside of prime time.   
A television show starts with a producer, who creates the show and sells it to a 
network, who schedules it to be aired during a particular time slot on their affiliated 
stations
2
.  When producers set out to create a television series, particularly dramatic 
programming
3
, evidence shows that the first season of a show will probably not bring in a 
profit.  In fact, it will likely bring a loss, because of the high fixed costs of creating a new 
show.  The producers may not recover the costs of the show at all during its first run
4
, 
unless the show is very popular.  Until recently, producers hoped that the series would 
make it to about 100 episodes (usually between 4 and 5 seasons), when it would have the 
best potential to be syndicated on other networks.   
                                                 
1
 Prime time is considered to be Sunday 7pm until 11pm and 8pm until 11pm for the rest of the week. 
2
 See Appendix A for a diagram the primary market structure during the time period of the data used in this 
paper. 
3
 Dramatic programming includes situation comedies as well as drama series. 
4
 A first run is the original airing of the show as a new episode. 
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What exactly is syndication?  In the television industry, syndication is defined as 
the process of selling programs to individual local television stations.  The local stations 
use these programs to help fill time when there is no network programming provided.  
There are two specific types of syndication that are relevant to the television industry.  
One is first run syndication, which includes shows that are made specifically to sell to 
individual television stations and are never aired nationally by a network.  First run 
syndication includes shows such as Oprah and Jeopardy.  The other type of television 
syndication is called off network syndication and is the type of syndication that will be 
referred to as syndication for the rest of this paper.  Off network syndication is the 
process of selling reruns of a network show that originally aired during network prime 
time to the local stations.  Off network syndication is the way that many television series 
make most of their money.  Syndication, including first run as well as off network, is an 
almost $3 billion a year business (Berman 2007).  One of a producer’s biggest hopes is to 
get a piece of this rather large pie. 
The theory presented in this paper is that syndication may change the number of 
seasons that producers choose to make if the number of seasons affects the lifetime 
profits of the show.  People may argue that it is ultimately the networks decision whether 
to keep the program or not.  However, the producer can influence the decision of the 
network by adjusting the price that they would accept from the network for the show.  
Syndication could affect the number of seasons in two ways.  One way depends on the 
price elasticity of demand for syndication and the other depends on shifts in demand.  
The price elasticity of demand is the focus of the analysis of this paper. 
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If the price elasticity of demand is low, or inelastic, syndication could decrease 
the number of seasons that are made because as new seasons are created the producers 
dilute the market for their reruns, and therefore, they drive down the price that they can 
charge for syndicating the show.  In this case, an additional season actually reduces 
lifetime profits because it drives the price of syndication down so much that their profits 
from syndication fall by more than the profits they receive from the new season.  
However, if more seasons do not drive down the price significantly or if demand is elastic, 
they are able to make more seasons than would be profitable without syndication and 
increase their lifetime profits by making additional seasons. 
The other possibility is that shifts in the demand for syndication could change the 
ideal number of seasons that a producer should make.  In this case, high demand for 
syndication would increase the number of seasons that would be profitable.  Decreases in 
demand would decrease the number of seasons that are made.  The demand for 
syndication or reruns is dependent upon the type of show and the popularity; so different 
shows may optimize by creating more seasons than others.  
Wildman and Robinson (1995) did a thorough analysis of the market for 
syndication and what makes a show successful in syndication.  One of their main findings 
is a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the number of episodes squared in 
a regression with syndication ratings as the dependent variable.  This supports their 
theory that there is a declining marginal syndication profit from new episodes.  They also 
claim that this will possibly cause the cancellation of a show before the ratings for the 
show start to fall.  The theory and model presented in this paper is an extension of the 
theory presented by Wildman and Robinson. 
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Analysis of the theoretical model presented here gives the same results for 
diminishing marginal profits or an inelastic price elasticity of demand.  However, there 
could be a more complex result. It is possible that for low numbers of episodes the 
marginal contributions will be increasing to profits, such that up to a certain point 
syndication will cause a show to run longer and that after this point the opposite will 
happen.  In other words, the proposed theory is that the price elasticity of demand for 
syndication is elastic for low numbers of episodes and becomes more inelastic for larger 
numbers of episodes.  Based on market observations, the expected break point will likely 
be around the 100 episode mark (approximately 4 to 5 seasons). 
Duration models are often used to analyze the probability of a particular event 
happening over the course of time.  Therefore, a duration model is a good fit for 
analyzing this problem, where the event, or death as it is often referred, would be the 
cancelation of the show.  The probit model is used to predict the probability that a show 
will not end in any given period depending whether it has been syndicated or not. Two 
probit models are analyzed, one for syndicated series and one for non-syndicated series.  
The cumulative probability of being canceled in any given season is calculated based on 
the estimated probit models and compared.  The results show that syndicated shows are 
less likely to be canceled in seasons one through six.  Then after season seven a 
syndicated show is more likely to be canceled.  Thus the theoretical models predicts that 
shows that are syndicated have a more elastic demand for seasons at a lower number of 
seasons and a more inelastic demand at a higher number of seasons. 
 In the next section of the paper, a brief history of the market for syndication is 
covered.  Then in the following section, the model is presented and solved.  Then the 
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preliminary data and analysis is discussed, which is followed by the empirical.  The paper 
concludes in the final section. 
History 
 Although there was some television programming prior, the real start of regular 
network programs was in 1946 (Brooks and Marsh 1995).  Originally, television shows 
were broadcast live, but in the late 1950s stations switched to filmed programming 
(Museum 2007).  This is when second showings and syndication were discovered by the 
networks (Museum 2007).  Therefore, until this time, there was no market for syndication 
at all. 
 Most non-dramatic shows, including game shows, news programs, and reality 
shows, have not seen much action from the syndication market.  The market for 
syndication is usually the largest for television shows aired during the prime time 
viewing hours, particularly sitcoms (Caves 2005).  The Financial Interest and Syndication 
Rules, from the late 1960s to the mid 1990s, actually ensured that the rights to the 
program went back to the producers after so many network runs (Museum 2007).  
Therefore, the “extra” income generated from syndicating television programs may give 
producers the incentive to create shows that are not profitable in the first run.  In fact, it is 
not unusual for only 80-85% of the costs to be recovered from the original network 
licensing fee (Vogel 2001).   
 Syndication is generally reached after 4 or 5 seasons of original network air time.  
This is because the most popular type of syndication is strip or daily syndication, which is 
where they run the show, typically, five days a week at the same time.  This requires 
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more episodes than airing the show once a week, and therefore, they want a minimum 
number of episodes for this type of syndication.   
Strip syndication was particularly useful for cable networks.  When many of the 
cable networks were new, it was easier for them to run syndicated programs rather than 
produce their own (Caves 2005).  The growth of the number of cable networks thus 
increased the demand for syndication over the years starting around the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.   
When a network buys the license to syndicate a series, they usually buy the rights 
for all of the episodes (Caves 2005).  The first syndication contract for a series is usually 
entered into after about four seasons, as mentioned previously, but before the series is 
finished with its first run (Caves 2005).  Therefore, when producers are making the 
decision about how many seasons to make they have at least some information as to what 
the show is worth in syndication.   The price for these contracts is usually listed per 
episode; as either a monetary amount or the right to sell ad time during the show, stated 
in minutes (Caves 2005).  This and the fact that dating on contracts for syndication is not 
widely available make the price of syndication hard to identify empirically. 
Now consider what types of shows are most likely to be syndicated.  Because 
shows often run daily during syndication, it is more likely that a viewer may miss an 
episode.  This makes self contained plot lines good for syndication.  If the plot lines carry 
over significantly from episode to episode, it may be hard for occasional viewers to enjoy 
the show.  This could be one reason that a show similar to Seinfeld, the self-proclaimed 
show about nothing, does so well in syndication.  Although there may be some carry over 
of plot lines, most of the humor comes across even if you have never seen any of the 
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preceding episodes.  Sitcoms, in general are known for being good at this.  Another type 
of show that has done well with reruns is crime dramas, such as Law & Order, likely, 
because they also have self contained plot lines.  On the other hand, shows like 24 which 
rely heavily on understanding previous episodes may not do quite as well in the 
syndication market.   
Theoretical Model and Solution 
The hypothesis of this paper is analyzed with a lifetime profit function for a 
television series.  It consists of two main parts: first, the profits from the first run of the 
program and second, the profits from syndication in other markets.  The profits from the 
first run are made up of the revenues from the initial broadcasting network licensing fee 
minus the costs of producing the show.  Syndication is assumed to have no extra costs 
and is therefore pure profit.  This is due to the fact that the costs of syndication are 
minimal in relation to the production costs of the series. 
The revenue from creating a new season of the series has been simplified to a 
function of quality in that season, qt, and price, pt, which is being defined as the amount 
that the networks are willing to pay for quality, where t denotes the season number.    The 
quality of the show might include such things as the notoriety and quality of the actors, as 
well as the quality of the writers, set designers and wardrobe staff.  The price in this 
model is exogenous for simplification.  Therefore, revenue for an individual season is the 
following: 
(1)  ttt qpR  . 
The cost function is quadratic in quality and includes a significant fixed cost.  
Therefore, the marginal cost is increasing in quality (i.e., higher quality is more 
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expensive, and it is more expensive to hire better writers, actors, etc.).  In the model, 
represents a shifter for the cost of quality of different types of shows.  It is cheaper to 
increase the quality of reality shows compared to dramatic programming.  Therefore 
those two types of shows may have different ’s.  here is also a high fixed cost, ct, to 
producing the season, which may include renting the studio space and filming equipment 
as well as many other items.  The cost function is represented as the following: 
(2)  ttt cq
tt
C 






 2
)(
1
2
1

.  
Equations (1) and (2) combined yield a profit function for an individual season that 
simplifies to the following: 
(3)  
  










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


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








 tttttt
cq
tt
qp
r
2
1 )(
1
2
1
1
1

 . 
This includes a discount rate for a season in the future, which is an interest rate 
represented by r. 
The inverse demand function for syndicated seasons is 
(4)   )1(tkst , for Tt 5 , where 0 and 0k , 
and 
(5)   kTst , for Tt  , 
where st is the price for which producers can sell syndicated seasons.    The inverse 
demand function shifts around depending on the value of k and  which may vary for 
different types of shows, k is a scalar or demand shifter and  is the inverse of the price 
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elasticity of demand for syndicated seasons.  Only previously aired seasons are 
considered eligible for syndication, therefore the number of seasons sold is t-1, while the 
final new season is denoted as T. 
Putting all of this together yields the following lifetime profit function for the 
producer of a show: 
(6)  
 
 




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 


















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










T
t Tt
tttt
T
t
ttttt
Ts
r
ts
r
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tt
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r 5 1
11
1
2
1 )1(
1
)1(
)1(
1
)(
1
2
1
1
1

. 
In this model, it is assumed that producers can begin selling the series in syndication after 
the fourth season.  Therefore, revenues from syndication are considered starting in the 
fifth season and the future revenue from syndication is also discounted. 
  This simplified model enables a closed form solution, and it is still useful in 
analyzing the optimal ending point for a series.  First the optimal number of seasons is 
determined when syndication is not a factor and then compared to the optimal decision 
when syndication is included.   
In the case where syndication is not considered, the lifetime profit function for 
creating the series and the first run airing is 
(7)  
 


 
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
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tttttn
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tt
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2
1 )(
1
2
1
1
1

, 
where t=1,2,3…T is the time period, and the first season is the current period.  The 
subscript n indicates that this is for first run only.  There are two choice variables in this 
profit function; one is the quality of the season, and the other is the number of seasons 
that they produce.   
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First, to find the optimal level of quality for a season, the first derivative of 
equation (3) with respect to qt is considered: 
(8)  
















 ttt
t
t q
tt
p
rq )(
1
)1(
1
1 

. 
By setting the derivative equal to zero and solving for qt, optimal value for the quality of 
a season is determined to be given by the following: 
(9)  )( 2ttpq tt   . 
The quadratic nature of the quality of the show as time passes suggests that there is a 
learning curve, so to speak, meaning that it takes some time to develop characters on the 
show, establish relationships between characters, and generally make the show “work”.  
However, over time the quality diminishes.  This may be because the writers run out of 
ideas and the viewers get tired of the same old plot lines.    
Substituting for qt and simplifying, lifetime profits from new seasons are the 
following: 
(10)  
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In time period t the seasonal profits are 
(11)  




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1 22
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In order to determine how seasonal profits change over time, the first and second 
derivative are presented for the seasonal profit function with respect to t, as follows: 
(12)  tpp
t
t 22
2
1





 
and 
(13)  02
2
2



p
t
t . 
Therefore the seasonal profit function can be determined to be concave over time.  Profit 
is the highest for the season closest to
2
 .  Assuming that the fixed cost is the same in 
every period, if the revenue in this season is not greater than the fixed cost, the series will 
not generate a profit during any season, which is often true for dramatic series.  Even if 
the series does make a profit in some seasons, it is still possible and likely that the profits 
from those seasons are not large enough to cover the loss from the first few seasons, 
which would typically be recovered during syndication of the show.  However, because 
of the current assumption that there is no syndication, a lifetime profit will also be 
assumed.  After the show starts making a profit, the show will maximize its lifetime 
profit by creating new seasons until the profits from the last season are equal to zero.   
 Setting equation (11) equal to zero and solving for t, results in the following: 
(14)  cp
p
t 8
2
1
2
22  

  
and  
(15)  Tcp
p
t  8
2
1
2
22

. 
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The season number given by equation (14) is the breakeven season, where revenue from 
that season is exactly equal to the costs from that season.  After that point the series 
begins making a profit until the final season given by equation (15), where profits are 
again approximately equal to zero.   
Adding syndication does not change the potential profit that comes from creating 
the new season, but creates additional revenue from the series.  It can create a tradeoff 
though between profits from the new season and profits from syndication.  The profit 
function including syndication is the following: 
(16)  
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Where the derivative of st, given by equation (5), with respect to T is the following: 
(17)  0
)(
1 

 kT
T
st . 
Therefore, the price at which the producers can sell the seasons in syndication is 
decreasing as the number of seasons that they have to sell increases.  The second 
derivative is the following: 
(18)  0)1( 2
2
2


  kT
T
st , 
showing that the price decreases at an increasing rate as the number of seasons increases. 
  By assuming that the revenue from syndication of a television series is only 
dependent on the number of seasons available rather than the quality of the seasons, the 
quality choice for the producers is unaffected by the ability to syndicate.  However, the 
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decision to produce additional seasons is still affected by the syndication market.  The 
series’ or inverse demand elasticity) will determine whether syndication increases the 
optimal number of seasons or decreases it. 
 The effect of  can be seen by examining how the revenue from syndication 
changes with different ’s, particularly the effect of a  equal to one, less than one and 
greater than one. To start, revenue from syndication after the final season has been 
produced is given by 
 1 kTSt  
The derivative of the revenue function with respect to the number of seasons is used to 
determine how revenues change with the total number of seasons produced as follows: 
(20)   


kT
T
St )1( . 
The effects of a unit elastic demand curve on the syndication revenue are first examined 
by substituting for  = 1 in the first derivative, 
 0)11( 

 kT
T
St . 
Since the derivative is zero, the revenue does not change as T changes.  In this case, the 
revenue in a period is k regardless of how many seasons they sell in syndication, because 
the price elasticity of demand is unit elastic.  Therefore, the optimal number of seasons 
would not change from the case where there is no syndication.   
If  is less than one, equation (20) would be greater than zero.  Therefore, when  
is smaller than one or when the demand is elastic, revenue is increasing in a period when 
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another season is added.  In this case, the producers would actually increase the number 
of seasons that they create compared to the case without syndication to maximize their 
lifetime profits. 
If  is greater than one, equation (20) would be less than zero.  Therefore, when  
is greater than one or demand is inelastic, revenue is decreasing in a period when another 
season is added.  In this case, the producers might decrease the number of seasons that 
they create compared to the case without syndication to maximize their lifetime profits. 
Data 
For this paper, data was collected from The Complete Directory to Prime Time 
Network and Cable TV Shows: 1946-Present, Ninth Edition, including genre, and start 
date and end dates, which were used to calculate the Season Number. In addition, the first 
run Nielsen Rating
5
 and the day of the week and time the program aired was collected 
from Network Programs by Designated Market Area published by Nielsen for each 
November from 1980-1998. Finally, whether the show was syndicated in that year, the 
equivalent national rating in syndication, and the number of households watching were 
collected from the Report on Syndicated Program Audiences also published by Nielsen 
for for each November in 1980 to 1988 and 1990 to 1997. 
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest.  The 
variable Length refers to the runtime of one episode of a series in minutes.  The most 
common runtimes for episodes are 30 and 60 minutes and the longest running program is 
NFL Monday Night Football.  On average episode length is about 47 minutes.  The 
variable Season Number corresponds to t from the theoretical model and refers to how 
                                                 
5
 According to the Nielsen Media Research website, a rating is the percent of households with televisions 
who are watching a program. 
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many seasons the series has aired up to that point.  In this data set, the average season 
number is about 4 seasons.  The series that ran for the highest number of seasons is a 
Walt Disney anthology that played on Sunday evenings on ABC off and on for 35 
seasons and was presented under several names including The Wonderful World of 
Disney.  The next longest running series are 60 Minute, with 30 seasons and NFL 
Monday Night Football with 29 seasons, followed by the newsmagazine series 20/20, 
with 20 seasons by 1998.  All other shows in this data set had 15 seasons or less.   
The variable for the Number of Telecasts refers to the number of episodes that 
Nielsen used in a given year to calculate the ratings for that series in that year.  The 
variable Ratings Share is the actual Nielsen Rating reported in November of a given year 
for the first run episodes of the prime time program. The average show season has a 
Ratings Share of 12.83.  This ranges from a low of 1.3 for the series DiResta and Legacy 
both of which aired for only one season on UPN in 1998.  The top rated show in this data 
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics for First Run Shows 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Length 46.58 20.17 30 195 
Season Number 4.06 4.36 1 34 
Number of Telecasts 3.40 0.83 1 5 
Rating share 12.83 5.85 1.3 42.8 
Number of Households 11507.73 5045.24 21.76 37624 
Number of Stations 182.24 13.66 113 194 
Residual Rating 0.00 4.03 -11.7224 24.5464 
Canceled 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Ever syndicated 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Number of seasons syndicated 5.67 3.24 1 17 
Sum of syndication ratings 7.59 13.43 0 121.5 
Notes: Observations: 578 for number of syndicated seasons; 1115 for number of stations; 1395 
for all others. 
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set is the Cosby Show in its 3
rd
 (1986) season, with its 2
nd
 (85), 4
th
 (87), and 5
th
 (88) 
seasons being ranked 4
th
, 2
nd
, and 7
th
 in Ratings Share, respectively.  Rounding out the 
top ten show seasons are the 4
th
  (85) and 5
th
 (86) seasons of Family Ties ranked the 6
th
 
and 3
rd
, respectively, the 4
th
 (1980) season of Dallas ranked 5th, the 1
st
 (87) season of A 
Different World ranked 8
th
, the 5
th
 (86) season of Cheers ranked 9
th
, and the 12
th
 (80) 
season of 60 Minutes, ranked 10
th
.   
One problem with this measure of ratings is that over time the average ratings for 
a season has gone down due to the increased number of options during prime time, 
including the introduction of new broadcast networks including Fox, the WB, and UPN, 
as well as the number of cable stations that are available.  In addition, the base of the 
percentage rating has increased over time as the number of households with televisions 
has increased.  For example, the lowest rated show in 1986 has a Ratings Share of 4.6 
which corresponds to a Number of Households equal to 3563 or approximately 3.5 
million, while in 1998 a Ratings Share of 4.6 is equivalent to 4530 or approximately 4.5 
million.  The reason that this second issue must be considered is that the value to 
advertisers comes from the actual number of people that view the show and not 
necessarily from the percentage of people that see the show.  Therefore, a show with the 
same Ratings Share in 1980 and 1998, actually have a different value to advertisers. In 
order to alleviate these problems the Residual Rating is used and presented below. 
The Number of Households gives the average number of households that were 
reported to watch an episode of a program in each November during the Nielsen 
reporting period.  This is the number used by Nielsen to calculate the Ratings Share.  The 
Number of Stations is the number of local television stations reported by Nielsen that 
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aired the program during November.  The Residual Rating is a normalized ratings 
calculation used to account for the fact that ratings on average have gone down over time 
due to the increased number of options available during prime time. 
The variable Canceled is a binary variable, represented as a zero if the show 
continues after that season or a one if that is the show’s final season in prime time.  The 
average value is .4 which means 40% of the show seasons in the data set are the final 
season of the series.  In fact, there are a large number of shows that are canceled after 
their first season.   
The variables describing the syndication of the shows include Ever Syndicated, 
which is also a binary variable and is represented by a zero if the show is not found in the 
syndication data series and a one if the show has been syndicated in at least one year.  
About 41% of show seasons were syndicated in at least one year.  The Number of 
Seasons Syndicated represents that number of years the show was observed in 
syndication, with an average number of years in syndication at approximately 5.67.  The 
Sum of Syndicated Ratings, which is the sum of the ratings observed for each year the 
show is in syndication.  The average is about 7.59 with a maximum of 121.5. 
Empirical Analysis 
The data for this paper is analyzed in several steps.  The first step is to look at the 
likelihood of being syndicated by type of program.  Then the effects of various factors on 
the show’s ratings are analyzed.  Finally, a hazard model for the likelihood of being 
cancelled is used to examine the effects of syndication on the decision to cancel the 
program. 
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In Table 1.2 the results of a Linear probability model show that all categories of 
television shows are more likely to be syndicated than a variety program except Public 
Service and Sports show, which do not have significant values.  This is likely to be in 
part due to the fact that there are only 2 observations in each of these categories.  
Adventure dramas and Comedies are the most likely to be syndicated relative to Variety 
programs, with General Dramas and Police Dramas also more likely to be syndicated 
than variety programs. 
Table 1.2 Likelihood of Syndication Ever by 
Program Type 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.204 5.41 
Adventure 0.305 4.14 
Comedy 0.280 6.71 
Drama 0.167 3.56 
Police 0.179 3.59 
Public Service -0.204 -1.75 
Sports -0.204 -1.79 
R 
2
  0.051 
 
Syndication Mean 0.404  
Notes: Number of Observations: 1488. Linear probability 
model estimates all relative to variety shows.  
 
 The next step of the analysis is a regression of the effects of the first run 
characteristics of a show on the ratings of a show.  The results of this regression are 
shown in Table 1.3.  This regression includes the program type, the network, the day of 
the week, the start time of the show, the episode length of the show, the year, the number 
of seasons, and the number of seasons squared.  The variable Year is included because 
overall ratings have fallen overtime and this will help to capture that trend.  The variables 
Season and Season Squared are used to capture the trend for increased for ratings to 
increase during the first couple of seasons and then start to decline. 
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Table 1.3 Estimated Ratings 
Variables Coefficient t-value 
Program Type   
Adventure -0.035 -0.05 
Comedy 1.271 2.52 
Drama 0.955 2.14 
Police 0.397 0.84 
Public 0.531 0.5 
Sports 1.470 0.94 
Network   
ABC 6.404 7.49 
CBS 6.951 8.11 
Fox 2.646 3.01 
NBC 7.795 9.15 
UPN -0.306 -0.25 
Day of week   
Friday -0.771 -1.94 
Monday 0.948 2.2 
Saturday -1.489 -3.63 
Sunday 0.303 0.7 
Thursday 2.009 5.16 
Tuesday 1.468 3.55 
   
Start Time -3.958 -1.12 
Length -0.018 -1.48 
Year -0.464 -20.83 
Season  0.934 15.06 
Season Squared -0.024 -9.21 
R 
2 
0.526 
 Notes: Observations 1395. Program types relative to 
variety shows; networks relative to W; Day of week 
relative Wednesday. Ratings are shares.  
 
Overall, the program type does not appear to have a significant effect on the 
ratings.  Although, being a comedy or general drama may have a small positive 
correlation with ratings relative to variety programs.  The network does seem to have an 
impact on ratings the three oldest and most established networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS 
seem to get the best ratings with Fox’s ratings only slightly higher than the WB’s and 
UPN’s ratings not significantly different from the WB’s.  Day of the week has a small 
  
20 
 
impact on ratings although not as big of an impact as the network.  Thursdays generally 
have the highest ratings relative to Wednesdays, and Saturdays generally have the lowest 
ratings.  The effects of Start Time and the Length of the show on the Ratings are not 
significantly different from zero, and therefore, have little effect on ratings.  The year of 
the show does have a significantly negative effect as discussed earlier due to the fact that 
there are an increased number of networks and therefore, options available.   
A duration model is used for the analysis of this model.  It will analyze the 
probability of a show being cancelled in a particular season based on first run ratings and 
the success in syndication, because the model assumes that producers can perfectly 
predict how well a show will do in syndication.  More specifically, the probability that a 
show will be cancelled after episode t, conditional on the fact that episode t was made is 
evaluated.   
The probit model is used to analyze the effects of show characteristics on the 
probability that the show will not be canceled in any given year.  The models for Non-
Syndicated and Syndicated shows were estimated separately due to the hypothesized 
differences on how syndication will affect cancelation.  The results of this model are 
displayed in Table 1.4.  
The Probit model gives the probability of not being canceled in any given season. 
From these estimates we calculate the cumulative probability of being canceled in each 
year. The benchmark just for purposes of simplicity is NBC, Thursday, middle of the 
programming evening, 1990. We assume average share and households for both non- 
syndicated and syndicated programs, and same for other variables. 
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Because the coefficients of the probit model cannot be directly interpreted the 
cumulative probability of cancelation after the end of each season is calculated using the 
estimates and presented in Table 1.5. 
Table 1.4. Probit Estimates of Non-Cancelation 
 Non-Syndicated Syndicated 
Independent Variables: Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Intercept -111.796 (26.689) -127.035 (39.819) 
Number of Seasons 0.109 (0.038) -0.442 (0.071) 
(Number of Seasons) 
2
  -0.005 (0.002) 0.017 (0.005) 
Network 
    
ABC 0.134 (0.141) 0.111 (0.194) 
CBS 0.060 (0.146) 0.450 (0.224) 
Fox 0.944 (0.206) 1.691 (0.346) 
Day of Week 
    
Friday -0.110 (0.185) 0.027 (0.279) 
Monday -0.255 (0.193) -0.323 (0.301) 
Saturday -0.126 (0.198) -0.108 (0.282) 
Sunday 0.120 (0.204) 0.155 (0.307) 
Thursday -0.389 (0.186) -0.466 (0.269) 
Tuesday -0.267 (0.201) -0.305 (0.286) 
Start Time 5.056 (1.628) 2.312 (2.430) 
Length 0.007 (0.003) -0.008 (0.006) 
Year 0.054 (0.013) 0.063 (0.020) 
Number of Telecasts 0.157 (0.069) 0.157 (0.117) 
Quarter Hour Rating 
Share 
0.128 (0.046) 0.174 (0.047) 
Number of Households 9.169 (4.727) 7.016 (5.051) 
Notes: Event estimated is probability of not being canceled. Observations: Non-syndicated 
programs (356 non-canceled show years; 415 canceled). Syndicated programs (466 non-
canceled show years; 112 canceled). Network effects relative to NBC; Day of week effects 
relative to Wednesday.    
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Table 1.5. Cumulative Probability of 
Cancelation after end of Each Season 
Season 
 
Non-
Syndicated 
 
Syndicated 
1 
 
0.38 
 
0.05 
2 
 
0.59 
 
0.15 
3 
 
0.72 
 
0.30 
4 
 
0.80 
 
0.50 
5 
 
0.85 
 
0.69 
6 
 
0.89 
 
0.84 
7 
 
0.91 
 
0.93 
8 
 
0.93 
 
0.98 
9 
 
0.95 
 
0.99 
10 
 
0.96 
 
1.00 
11 
 
0.97 
 
1.00 
12 
 
0.97 
 
1.00 
13 
 
0.98 
 
1.00 
14 
 
0.98 
 
1.00 
     The results show that syndicated shows are less likely to be canceled in seasons 
one through six.  Then after season seven a syndicated show is more likely to be canceled.  
Thus the theoretical models predicts that shows that are syndicated have a more elastic 
demand for seasons at a lower number of seasons and a more inelastic demand at a higher 
number of seasons.  Figure 1.1 below shows a graph of the cumulative probabilities of 
Non-Syndicated and Syndicated shows being canceled after the end of each season.  This 
graph shows the obvious difference in the probabilities of cancellation between the two 
types of shows. 
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Figure 1.1 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
Syndication is a major player in the market for television series and is the main 
reason that many dramatic programs are profitable.  The extra revenues from this source 
help to improve the quality of the programming that is available on television because the 
higher costs can be covered with syndication even if they can not be covered by the sale 
of the rights to the first run.  The effects of syndication are an important factor in the 
decisions of show producers.   
The theoretical model in this paper predicts that if the demand for syndication is 
elastic, the producers would actually increase the number of seasons that they create 
compared to the case without syndication to maximize their lifetime profits.  While if 
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demand is inelastic, the producers might decrease the number of seasons that they create 
compared to the case without syndication.   
The empirical analysis includes a probit model that is used to calculate the 
cumulative probability of being canceled in any given season.  The cumulative 
probabilities show that syndicated shows are less likely to be canceled in in the first six 
seasons.  This indicates that shows that are syndicated have a more elastic demand for 
seasons in syndication at lower numbers of seasons. Then after season seven a syndicated 
show is more likely to be canceled, predicting that the demand for seasons in syndication 
is more inelastic in later seasons.  Therefore, shows like Sienfeld and Friends may have 
been canceled before the maximum first run profit was actually achieved. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REGULATING REALITY: 
EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL INTEREST AND SYNDICATION RULES 
Introduction 
Survivor, Big Brother, Celebrity Apprentice, I’m a Celebrity Get Me Out of Here 
and Dancing with the Stars are just a handful of the reality programs that have been 
plaguing the broadcast networks since the year 2000, while the 1990s were considered 
the decade of the Sitcom with shows like Seinfeld, Frasier, Friends, and Everybody 
Loves Raymond.  Have you ever wondered what happened?  Some may speculate that 
Americans have gotten dumber.  Do Americans really prefer the mindless entertainment 
of reality shows?  Not that a little mindless entertainment cannot be fun but what 
happened to the wit and satire of the well thought out plot line and the perfectly timed 
punch line?  Is this shift to reality programs because these shows are so cheap to make or 
is there more to the story?  Could this shift be a result of the removal of the Financial 
Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn Rules)? 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of the Fin-Syn Rules, which 
were removed in 1995, on the programming offered by the broadcast networks.  These 
rules may have increased the incentives for the major broadcast networks to air dramatic 
programming, including situation comedies (sitcoms) and dramas during the 70s, 80s, 
and 90s, while decreasing the incentives for the networks to air reality type programming, 
which includes game shows, news magazines, variety shows, and reality competitions.  
Then when the rules were removed, shifting the rights of syndication ownership to the 
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networks, they may have found it more profitable to shift to inexpensive programming 
such as reality programs and reduce the number of dramas that they air. 
This change in the incentives may or may not have been welfare enhancing to 
society.  The networks may be more efficient and profitable at making reality 
programming, and therefore, the Fin-Syn Rules may have been welfare detracting, 
because the rules may reduce the efficiency of the networks.  However, it is also possible 
that even though the reality programming is often more profitable for the networks, the 
consumers may value it less than other types of programming.  If this effect is large 
enough the rules could be welfare enhancing. 
The Fin-Syn Rules were enacted by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in 1970 and phased out in the early 1990s being completely removed in 1995.  The 
two main reasons the rules were enacted are (1) to help independent producers and 
independent television stations by limiting the power of the broadcast networks and (2) to 
increase content diversity during prime time.  The FCC could not directly control content 
due to the First Amendment and thought that having many producers would help to 
indirectly increase the diversity of the programming (Einstein 2004).  The rules restricted 
networks from taking a financial interest in the programs aired beyond the first run.  One 
of the arguments against the networks having a financial stake in the syndication of their 
programs is that they would withhold these “high quality” programs from independent 
stations, forcing them to air programs of lesser quality (Wildman and Robinson 1995).  
Oba and Chan-Olmsted (2006) did find evidence that once the networks and producers 
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integrated, syndicated programs did tend to be favored by affiliated stations.  They, 
however, did not find significant evidence of market foreclosure. 
Although the Fin-Syn Rules appeared to do little to increase content diversity, 
they did appear to effectively keep the independent producers in the market of producing 
prime time television programs.  In 1970, eleven of the top 20 producers in prime time 
were independents.  Then in 1989, nine of the top 20 producers were still independents.  
However, by 1995, when the Fin-Syn Rules were officially revoked, there were only 15 
companies producing regularly scheduled prime time programs for the top three networks, 
six of whom were independent producers and the rest of which were the networks 
themselves and major film studios.  In 2002, there were only four independents and a 
total of 10 companies producing programs for prime time, with ABC, NBC, and CBS 
producing 63.6% of their programs (Einstein 2004).  There was some consolidation of the 
market over the more than 20 years that the Fin-Syn Rules were in affect; however, there 
was a significant movement toward consolidation in the 10 years around the time they 
were removed. 
In the fall 1990 season, only 15% of the prime time schedules for the top three 
networks were reality type programming.  In fall 2002, reality programming was up to 
25% and in fall 2007 it was taking up about 36% of the prime time schedule.  Figure 2.1 
shows the percent of reality type programming in prime time from 1964 until 2007.  A 
trend line is depicted in this chart as well and the dashed lines indicate the beginning and 
end of the Fin-Syn Rules.  It can be seen that the amount of reality programs decrease 
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during the Fin-Syn era and increases steadily after it is over.  However, it does appear 
that this shift to reality programming does not really take off until about 1998.   
Figure 2.1 
 
This change in the programming mix is an interesting phenomenon.  Although 
this could easily be explained away by a change in consumer preferences, this is not an 
economically interesting explanation.  The hypothesis of this paper is that the 
consolidation of the market after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked gave the networks 
some market power, particularly in the syndication market, which indirectly gave the 
networks the incentive to produce more reality type programming and reduce the amount 
of dramatic programming aired.  Therefore, the fact that the networks control almost 64% 
of what is produced during prime time gives them market power in the syndication 
market.  Indeed it is hard to deny the fact that the major broadcasting networks do have 
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an increased interest in the syndication market.  As of 2007, CBS Television Distribution 
Group owned eight of the top 10 rated syndicated shows (Berman 2007). 
However, in order for networks to take advantage of this market power in 
syndication, they must actually own some stock of programs in this market.  Therefore, 
this shift to reality programs is likely to happen sometime after the networks gain the 
rights to produce and syndicate their own programs, which could be why the major shift 
to reality programs actually began about 5 years after the change in the rules. 
 Although the television industry had not been widely analyzed by economists, 
there has been some very interesting and noteworthy research done.   Wildman and 
Robinson (1995) thoroughly analyze the market for syndication.  They find that dramas 
are the most likely to be syndicated but that comedies get the highest ratings in 
syndication.  They also find that non-fiction and variety shows are much less likely to be 
syndicated.  In general, it is also true that the market for syndication is usually the largest 
for television shows aired during the prime time viewing hours on broadcast television 
(Caves 2005).  Therefore, if the networks own the rights to this syndication they would 
have a strong hold on the market. 
Another important point to note is that most types of reality programs are 
produced at a much lower cost than dramatic programs (Caves 2005).  This is because 
reality type programs are less scripted than dramatic programs and therefore, do not 
require the services of highly paid actors and as high quality or as many writers.  They 
are also usually shot on a much less elaborate and inexpensive set.  Because of these 
cheaper production costs, a reality program does not have to have as much advertising 
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revenue in order to be as profitable as or more profitable than dramatic programs in the 
first run. 
 A model proposed by Wildman and Robinson (1995) supports the hypothesis of 
the model that I present in this paper and predicts that if the networks are behaving 
competitively during the Fin-Syn Era, they will in fact increase the amount of “reality” 
programming that they air while decreasing the amount of dramatic programming that 
they air.  While if the networks are acting together as a monopsonistic buyer during the 
Fin-Syn Era, the opposite will happen.  Preliminary, evaluation of the data suggests that 
the networks were acting more competitively during that time period.  Research by Barry 
Litman in 1979 indicates that the networks did move to a more competitive programming 
strategy during the late 1970s.  If this phenomenon persisted this would support the 
findings in the data. 
In the next section, the theoretical model is established and analyzed.  The 
following section discusses the data necessary for empirically analyzing the hypotheses 
attained from the model.  This is followed by a discussion of the methods for empirical 
estimation and the results.  The final section concludes and summarizes the analysis. 
Theoretical Model and Solution 
 Let us first examine and understand the model used by Wildman and Robinson 
(1995).  This simple model demonstrates the potential incentive for networks to move to 
more reality programming even if this is not the preference of consumers and motivates 
the hypothesis of this paper.  Next, a model based on a single network is presented, which 
shows that if the syndication market is monopolized by the network then the network will 
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choose to air fewer shows with a high value of syndication.  The last model used is a 
stock and flow model, which reveals why the networks may not have made this move 
immediately after the change in the law but started making this shift after some time. 
In this first model from Wildman and Robinson (1995), the networks have m time 
slots to fill and n programs from which to choose.  For any program i, for i=1,…,n, the 
present discounted value of the expected first run revenue is Ri, the present discounted 
value of the expected syndication revenue is Si, and the present discounted value of the 
production budget is Bi.  Therefore, the present discounted value of the expected profits 
for the lifetime of program i, are  
(1) i i i iD R S B   . 
Assuming a perfectly competitive market for syndication, where there are many 
producers, the networks and the producers will negotiate to broadcast the m programs 
with the highest total profits and split these profits between them.   
 However, if the networks own the rights to syndication and have some power in 
the syndication market, economic theory tells us that they may be able to increase their 
profits from syndication by reducing the quantity in the market.  Traditionally, the 
argument by independent producers and other interested groups has been that networks 
would produce and air the program but withhold the program from the syndication 
market.  This model, however, makes a slightly different prediction.   
If the network knows that it plans to withhold a particular program from 
syndication the potential profits from the show becomes 
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(2) i i iD R B  , 
which is likely to make shows with lower production budgets and even potentially lower 
first run revenues more profitable.  This can be seen easily by comparing two programs 
with equal potential profits, but where one has a higher syndication value than the other. 
Consider the following: 
(3) jjjiii BSRBSR  , where ji SS  . 
If the network ignores the syndication value, S, because it knows that it wants to withhold 
the program from the market then the comparison that they make is  
(4) jjii BRBR  ,  
where potential profits from show i are now less than the potential profits from show j.  It 
is often the case, as in reality programming versus dramatic programming, that Bj is 
likely to be less than Bi, because most shows with high syndication values are more 
expensive to make than those that are not very valuable in syndication.  Therefore, it is 
also possible that Rj is less than Ri.   I assume here that the revenue from the first run is 
the revenue generated by selling ad spots during the airing of the show.  Since advertisers 
are willing to pay more for larger audiences then it may be true that more consumers 
prefer program i to program j, or that program i attracts a larger audience than program j.  
However, the network will choose to air program j, thus making consumers worse off. 
Next, a model of the lifetime profits of a single network under three different 
conditions is presented.  The three conditions presented for lifetime profits include a 
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market with a single network during the Fin-Syn period that is acting as a monopsonist in 
market for prime time programs, a single network during the Fin-Syn period that is acting 
competitively, and a single network in the Post Fin-Syn period that has integrated with 
the producers.   
A single network is the most extreme case but shows how market power in the 
syndication market could affect the choice of programming by the network.  The parties 
involved are the network, who sells primetime programming to consumers via ad sales, 
the local television stations, who demand syndicated programming, and the producers, 
who make the programming.  The local television stations are network affiliates and must 
show the network programming during primetime but may choose to air either 
syndication or local programming during non-primetime hours.  During the Fin-Syn Era 
there are many producers, which are separate from the network, while during the Post 
Fin-Syn Era the network and the producers have integrated and are one unit.   
 First, the Fin-Syn Era is examined. The primary market is the market for 
primetime programming.  The players in the primary market are the network and the 
producers of the programs, where the network buys programs from the producers to air 
during primetime.  The producers can also sell the programs in a secondary market as 
well.  This secondary market is the market for off-network syndication.  The players in 
the secondary market are the producers and the individual television stations.  However, 
for a program to have value in this secondary market it must first air on the network in 
primetime.  This problem is analyzed from the network’s perspective. 
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The network has Q time slots to fill during the primetime hours.  They can fill 
those time slots with shows that have a high value in syndication, Hq , or with shows that 
have no value in syndication, Nq .  For simplicity, all shows of type H are of equal quality 
and have an equal value in syndication and all shows of type N are of equal quality.  
Therefore, the total number of  primetime slots, Q is  
(5) NH qqQ  , 
which can be rewritten as 
(6) HN qQq  . 
Therefore, the subscript on Hq  is suppressed going forward for simplicity.  The inverse 
demand curves which the network faces are represented by the following:  
(7) 0 1( )H H Hq q    . 
(8) 0 1( ) ( )N N NQ q Q q      . 
Equation (7) is the inverse demand for primetime shows that have a high value in 
syndication, q , where H  is the per season revenue that networks receive for a show.  
Equation (8) is the inverse demand by the network for primetime shows that have no 
value in syndication and N  is the per season revenue that networks receive for these 
shows.  The demand is derived from the revenue they can receive by selling ad time 
during primetime, which advertisers base on the number of people watching.  These 
represent the demand curves for the primary market. 
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 In addition to the primetime demand for shows, the individual television stations 
demand syndication with which to fill the time outside of primetime.  This is the 
secondary market.  These are the same shows, Hq , rerun at other times.  The inverse 
demand curve for syndication is represented as 
(9) 0 1( )S H S S Hq q    , 
where S  is the per season price a television station pays for showing a show in 
syndication. 
 It is assumed that there are n identical producers in the market.  Therefore, each 
producer, i, creates an equal protion,
n
1
, of the total quantities of each type of show.  The 
industry has the following costs of production: 
(10) 20 1( ) ( )HC q c q c q   
(11) 0( ) ( )NC Q q c Q q    
As seen in equation (10), the cost of producing programs with a high value in 
syndication, HC , is increasing in the number of programs produced, while equation (11) 
shows that the cost of shows with no value in syndication, NC , is not increasing.  This is 
assumed because the talent, in particular the writers and actors that are needed to produce 
shows with a high value in syndication are relatively scarce, while the resources for 
producing shows with no value in syndication are abundant.  It’s not hard to find 
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someone willing to participate in a game show or reality program; people are ready and 
willing to get their 15 minutes of fame. 
 The marginal costs of production is 
(12) 0 1( ) 2 ( )HMC q c c q   
(13) 0( )NMC Q q c   
Typically, the producer will simply set marginal cost of production equal to the market 
price.  In the case of shows with high syndication value, however, the producers will 
consider both the price they can get from the network for the first run and the price they 
can get from the stations for the reruns.  Therefore, the supply curve in the market for 
new programs with a high value in syndication is sum of the marginal costs to the 
producers minus the price for these programs in syndication, which is the following: 
(14) 0 1( ) (2 ) ( )H Sq c c q q     
While shows with no syndication value have the following market supply: 
(15) 0( )N Q q c   . 
 The next step in analyzing this problem is to examine the network’s behavior.  
Two cases are examined here, one where the network behaves as a monopsonist and 
recognizes their influence on the cost of television programs and another where the 
network behaves as if it were perfectly competitive.  First, the networks problem is 
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analyzed as if it were a monopsonist.  The network will maximize profits, which are 
represented by the following function: 
(16) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )M H N H Nq q Q q Q q q q Q q Q q            . 
The derivative with respect to q yields 
(17) 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 12 2 ( ) 4 2
M
H H N N S S oq Q q c c q q c
q

     

          . 
By setting the derivative equal to zero and rearranging the result is essentially 
(18) MR MC . 
Thus the network will equate the marginal revenue of its programming to the marginal 
cost across the two types of shows in order to maximize their profits.  The marginal 
revenue and marginal cost functions are the following: 
(19) 0 1 0 12 2 ( )M H H N NMR q Q q        . 
(20) 1 1 02(2 )M S SMC c q    . 
Solving the first order condition finds that the optimal number of shows with a high value 
in syndication in the case of a monopsonist is 
(21) 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
2
2( 2 )
H N S N
M
H N S
Q
q
c
   
  
  

  
 
 If, however, the network behaves competitively in buying programming, their 
profit function is  
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(22) ( ) ( )( ) ( )C H N H Nq q Q q Q q q Q q           , 
where the cost to the network does not depend on the quantities of programming that they 
choose.  In this case the derivative, after substituting for H  and N , is 
(23) 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 12 2 ( ) (2 )
C
H H N N S S oq Q q c c q c
q

     

          . 
The marginal revenue and marginal cost in this case are the following: 
(24) 0 1 0 12 2 ( )C H H N NMR q Q q        . 
(25) 1 1 0(2 )C S SMC c q    . 
The revenue portion of the profit function does not change in these first two cases.  
Therefore, MRM and MRC are exactly equal.  It is the marginal cost that changes in these 
two scenarios.   
 In this competitive case, the optimal quantity of shows with high value in 
syndication is 
(26) 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
2
2( )
H N S N
C
H N S
Q
q
c
   
  
  

  
, 
which yields the expected result that if they are acting as a monopsonist they chose a 
smaller quantity of shows with a high value of syndication than if they are not. 
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 In the Post Fin-Syn Era, the only thing that changes in the model is that the 
network and the producers integrate and become one entity.  Therefore, the network now 
has monopoly power in the syndication market and the profit function is 
(27) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P H N S H Nq q Q q Q q q q C q C Q q           . 
In this case the network is directly selling off network syndication itself.  Therefore, the 
demand for off network syndication moves to the revenue portion of the profit function.  
Also, the network is the producer and incurs the costs of production directly.  Thus, the 
first derivative is 
(28) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 12 2 ( ) 2 2
P
H H N N S S oq Q q q c c c
q

     

          , 
and the networks marginal revenue and marginal costs in this case are the following: 
(29) 0 1 0 1 0 12 2 ( ) 2P H H N N S SMR q Q q Q             
(30) 12PMC c q  
Solving for q yields 
(31) 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
2
2( )
H N S N
P
H N S
Q
q
c
   
  
  

  
, 
which is larger than qM but smaller than qC.  Figure 2.2 shows a graphical representation 
of these various equilibria.  Therefore, if the network was utilizing its market power in 
buying programs during Fin-Syn then the amount of programming with a high value in 
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syndication will rise after the Fin-Syn rules are removed.  However, if the network was 
acting competitively during Fin-Syn then the amount of programming with a high value 
in syndication will fall after Fin-Syn.  In particular one might see fewer sitcoms and more 
game shows and reality programming.  This result is regardless of the fact that there were 
no changes in the demand for either type of show by the audience. 
Figure 2.2 
 
 The last model used for this analysis is a stock and flow model.  This model is not 
fully developed yet but the idea is that there is some stock of syndication, Kt, available to 
the market at any given time, t.  The stock of syndication owned by producer, p, for p = 
1,…,P, is kpt and the stock of syndication owned by network, n, is knt, for n = 1,…, N.  
Therefore, 
Market Equilibria for One Network Model
M
R
 &
 M
C
MCm
MCp
MCc
MRp
MRm & MRc
Qm Qp Qc
m=Fin-Syn Era network bahaves as a monopsonist     c=Fin-Stn Era network behaves competitively     p=Post Fin-Syn Network
  
41 
 
(32) 
1 1
P N
t pt nt
p n
K k k
 
    
The value of this stock depreciates over time at a rate of .     
 During the Fin-Syn period, this entire stock of syndication is supplied by the 
producers of the television programs in a more competitive market.    Therefore, Kt = kpt 
and knt = 0.  It is also assumed that at the beginning of the period, the stock is in steady 
state based on the competitive equilibrium, such that the replacement rate offsets the 
depreciation.  Once the Fin-Syn Rules are removed, the networks begin to produce their 
own programming and they have to decide what type of programming to produce for 
themselves.  They know that they are gaining market power in the syndication market 
and in order to take advantage of this they must produce shows with higher syndication 
value.  Therefore, initially, the networks produce shows with high syndication value in 
order to build their stock of syndication.  Over time the networks build their stock, while 
the stock of the producers is depreciating.  Eventually, a new lower steady state stock of 
syndication is reached.  Then as the quantity of syndication available in the market falls, 
they can charge a price higher than that of the competitive market.   
Figure 2.3 depicts a simulation of the dynamic process described above and 
shows visually how the transition from independent producers to network ownership of 
syndication might take place.  The purple bars represent kpt, the stock of syndication 
owned by independent producers.  The light blue bars represent knt, the stock of 
syndication owned by the networks. The black line represents the total amount of 
syndication available at a given time.  The older stock of syndication depreciates, because 
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viewers get tired of watching the same show over and over again.  However, new shows 
are added every season to replace the depreciated stock.  Therefore, at the beginning of 
the time period, the independent producers are producing just enough new shows to offset 
the depreciation of old shows in order to keep them at the steady state level of 
syndication.   
Figure 2.3 
Stock of Syndication 
 
However, when the networks start anticipating the law change, they start 
producing their own shows and stop buying as many shows from the independents.  This 
is when the stock of syndication owned by the networks starts to grow and the stock 
owned by the independents starts to shrink to some minimal amount.  In addition to this 
transition in the production of programs, it is also possible that the networks start buying 
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up the rights to old shows from the independents.  The total stock of syndication may 
grow at first, but over time the networks will reduce the level of syndication to a new 
lower steady state, this is depicted in the graph as the flattening of the line.  This process 
could explain why the transition to reality programming was not immediate and possibly 
why the late 1990s was seen as the sitcom era.   
Data 
 The data necessary for the analysis of this theory include data collected from The 
Complete Directory to Prime Time Network and Cable TV Shows: 1946-Present, Ninth 
Edition, Neilsen’s Report on Syndicated Programs (ROSP), from 1980-1997 and 2004 to 
2007.  The fall schedules for each year, the network, number of seasons, seasons ranked 
in the Top 30 for ratings, and genre have been collected from The Complete Directory to 
Prime Time.  The genres are divided into either Scripted (sit coms, dramas, etc) or Non-
scripted (reality, newsmagazine, etc).  The reason for this division is the distinct 
differences in demand for syndication of sitcoms and dramas compared to other types of 
programs.  Data on which shows were syndicated in a given year as well as the average 
syndication ratings, and the number of stations syndicating the program is being collected 
from the ROSP for each year.   
 Table 2.1 describes the summary information on the data collected on the first run 
programs.  There are 1031 different shows in the data set, with only 812 of the shows 
having data for the first season.  The variable Total Seasons represents the total number 
of seasons that a show aired in prime time.  The variable Truncated is a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the show was still being aired in the first run after 2006, the last 
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year of the data set.  First Season is the fall year of the first season of a show.  Scripted is 
a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the show is scripted and a value of zero if it is not.  
Ranked Ever is a dummy variable that is a 1 if the show was ever ranked in the top 30 for 
the season’s ratings.  Ranked 1st Year is a dummy variable that is a 1 if the show was 
ranked in the Top 30 for the first season’s ratings.  The variable Syndicated is a dummy 
variable that is a 1 if the show was ever syndicated and 0 if it has not. Nat Syn Rating is 
the rating reported by Nielsen’s based on viewing in all designated market areas. Fin-Syn 
(1990) is a 1 if the show was started prior to 1990, about 28.9% and Post Fin-Syn (2000) 
is a 1 if the show started after the year 2000, about 25.9%.  The number of shows in the 
last six years of the data set is close in number to the number of shows in the first 10 
years of the data set because there are only three networks in the beginning of the data set 
while there are as many as six networks in the last six years. 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for First Run Shows 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Total Seasons 2.229 2.571 
Running {0,1} 0.087 0.283 
First Season 1994.140 7.742 
Scripted {0,1} 0.929 0.258 
Ranked Ever {0,1} 0.159 0.366 
Ranked 1st Year {0,1} 0.118 0.323 
Syndicated {0,1} 0.156 0.363 
Syndication Rating 0.186 0.594 
Fin-Syn (1990) {0,1} 0.289 0.454 
Post Fin-Syn (2000) {0,1} 0.259 0.438 
Notes: Obs 812 first-run shows with data for 1st year; 1031 total 
 
Table 2.2 provides some additional information on the shows that were syndicated.  
There are 899 show years that are observed in syndication.  The variable Year is the year 
a show was syndicated.  National Rating is again the rating reported by Nielsen’s based 
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on viewing in all designated market areas.  DMA Rating is the average rating across each 
designated market area that was carrying the program.  Prior to 98 reflects the percent of 
shows that are in the data set from 1980 to 1997. 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics for Syndication Data: 1980-1997, 2004-2007 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 1993.82 7.68 1980 2007 
National Rating 1.70 2.06 0.04 12.9 
DMA Rating 2.61 2.07 0.1 13.4 
Prior to 98 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Notes: Obs 899 except 897 for DMA ratings 
 
The average data for individual shows is summarized in Table 2.3.  There are 182 
shows that are observed in syndication.  First Year, Last Year and Middle Year are the 
first, middle and last year respectively that a show is observed in syndication.  National 
Rating and DMA ratings are defined as above however in this data set they have been 
averaged over each year that a show was syndicated.  Again, Prior to 98 reflects the 
percent of the data set that is from the period 1980 to 1997. 
Table 2.3 Summary of Syndication Data Averaged by Show 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
First Year 1993.050 8.780 1980 2007 
Last Year 1999.030 7.464 1980 2007 
Middle Year 1995.790 7.592 1980 2007 
National Rating 1.439 1.060 0.1 5.90 
DMA Rating 2.162 1.167 0.1 5.94 
Prior to 1998 0.639 0.443 0 1 
Notes: Obs. 182 
     
Empirical Analysis 
 The empirical analysis of the hypotheses in this paper is a multiple step process.  
The first step is to show that the trend in broadcast programming on the three major 
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networks has in fact changed over time to include more and more reality programming.  
Therefore, the fall schedules for each year are analyzed to see if the percent of reality 
programming on the networks does in fact increase and when it begins to change.   
The next step of the analysis is a regression analyzing the effects the Fin-Syn and 
Post Fin-Syn periods on the length of a program.  Each observation in the regression is 
the first season of each show.  The regressors include dummy variables for Fin-Syn and 
Post Fin-Syn with the transition period as the omitted variable, with one set of 
regressions defining the Fin-Syn period from 1980 to 1989, the transition period from 
1990 to 2000, and the Post Fin-Syn period as 2001 to 2006 and another set of regressions 
defining the Fin-Syn period from 1980 to 1992, the transition period from 1993 to 1997, 
and the Post Fin-Syn period from 1998 to 2006.  In addition, there is either a dummy 
variable called Ranked Ever or Ranked 1
st
 Year indicating whether the show was ever 
ranked in the top 30 shows for any season during its first run or whether the show was 
ranked in the top 30 shows for its first season.  The variable Syndication Rating, defined 
as the average rating in syndication for all viewing designated market areas is used in 
some regressions.  The variable Running is used to control for shows that have not 
completed their first run prior the end of the data set.  The dummy variable Syndicated is 
used in each regression to control for whether the show was ever observed in syndication.  
Finally, the main variables of interest include the interaction variables between the 
Syndicated and Post Fin-Syn variables and the Syndicated and Post Fin-Syn variables. 
The final step in the empirical analysis is to calculate the change in the number of 
seasons that a syndicated show runs between the Fin-Syn period and the Post Fin-Syn 
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period.  This will indicate whether networks are reducing the number of seasons in 
syndicated series Post Fin-Syn.  An F statistic is then calculated to provide the 
significance level of the changes calculated. 
The first part of the analysis is a test to see if the difference in the percentage of 
reality prime time programming is significantly different during the non-Fin-Syn periods 
and the Fin-Syn period. The average percent of prime time television dedicated to reality 
programming in the Pre-Fin-Syn Era, between the years 1964 and 1970 was about 26%.  
During the Fin-Syn Era, 1971-1993, the average percent of reality programming was 
about 16%.  Since the fall of the Fin-Syn Rules the percent of reality programming has 
gone up to an average of about 27%, measured currently only using data from 1996 until 
2007.  Using a simple t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the Fin-Syn Era mean and the 
Post Fin-Syn Era mean are equal with a probability of 2.41 x 10
-5
 or almost zero.  This 
preliminary test gives motivation to continue a deeper analysis.  
Table 2.4 presents the results of the six regressions.  The first three columns of 
regression results are for the longer transition period from 1990 to 2000 and the last three 
columns are for the shorter transition period from 1993 to 1997.  The t-stats are given in 
parenthesis below each coefficient.  All of the regressions give similar results.  However, 
the regressions that use the variable Ranked Ever and the Syndication Rating have the 
highest R-squared, while each regression in the set with the transition period from 1990 
to 2000 has a slightly higher R-squared than each respective regression in the set with the 
shorter transition period. 
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Table 2.4 Length of Program Run 
 
 Coefficients/(t-stats) 
Variables:   Transition Period 1990-2000 Transition Period 1993-1997 
Intercept 1.448 1.473 1.600 1.427 1.459 1.635 
 
(14.010) (14.530) (15.010) (9.82) (10.230) (10.900) 
Fin-Syn 0.062 0.056 0.038 0.078 0.051 -0.028 
 
(0.360) (0.330) (0.210) (0.43) (0.290) (-0.150) 
Post Fin-Syn -0.656 -0.606 -0.695 -0.410 -0.371 -0.487 
 
(-3.700) (-3.480) (-3.790) (-2.24) (-2.070) (-2.580) 
Ranked Ever 2.391 2.180 
 
2.412 2.199 
 
 
(11.480) (10.510) 
 
(11.52) (10.550) 
 Ranked 1st Season 
  
0.878  
 
0.887 
   
(3.930)  
 
(3.940) 
Syndication Rating 
 
0.998 1.255  1.001 1.261 
  
(5.830) (7.020)  (5.820) (7.020) 
Running 2.327 2.068 2.551 2.203 1.947 2.423 
 
(9.040) (8.080) (9.570) (8.68) (7.700) (9.200) 
Syndicated 3.461 2.232 2.574 3.594 2.350 2.702 
 
(10.600) (5.820) (6.380) (11.21) (6.180) (6.760) 
Syndicated × Fin-Syn -1.369 -1.361 -1.161 -1.501 -1.467 -1.259 
 
(-3.260) (-3.300) (-2.670) (-3.75) (-3.740) (-3.040) 
Syndicated × Post Fin-
Syn -2.541 -1.833 -2.227 -2.856 -2.129 -2.552 
 
(-5.260) (-3.750) (-4.320) (-6.11) (-4.480) (-5.110) 
R-squared 0.492 0.513 0.456 0.488 0.509 0.452 
Change in Length of 
Run -1.172 -0.472 -1.066 -1.355 -0.663 -1.293 
Prob(F) on Change 0.013 0.321 0.033 0.003 0.155 0.008 
Notes: Length of Program Run is total number of seasons that the show aired. The syn-fin rules 
were phased out in the early 90s and completely removed in 1995. This allows for a transition 
period both before and after as the change in the rules was anticipated and the market continued 
to consolidate even more after 1995. This transition period is 1990-2000 in the first three columns 
and 1993-1997 in the second three. Thus, the syn-fin period is alternatively measured by shows 
first aired prior to 1990 in the former and shows first aired prior to 1993 in the latter. Syndication 
rating is zero for shows never syndicated. Change in Length of Run is the difference between the 
coefficient on the interaction Syndicated and Post-syn-fin and the interaction of Syndicated and 
Syn-fin. The hypothesis test is that this is zero. The probability of the F statistic for this test is 
shown in the last row.   
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The Intercept for each regression indicates that the average length of a show that 
starts during the transition period and is essentially not Ranked and not Syndicated lasts 
approximately 1.5 seasons.  A show that is not syndicated during the Fin-Syn period is 
likely to last slightly longer than a show that is not syndicated during the transition period.   
Although the last regression that uses Ranked 1
st
 Season instead of Ranked Ever and the 
shorter transition period gives the opposite result.  While a show that is not syndicated 
during the Post Fin-Syn period is likely to be about half a season shorter than a show that 
is not syndicated during the transition period.  The coefficients on the Ranked Ever 
variable shows that being ranked in the top 30 for at least one of the show’s seasons 
increases the number of seasons by more than 2.  However, being ranked in the first 
season of the show only increases the length of a show by about 0.9 seasons.  The 
coefficient for Syndication Rating indicates that an increase in the average ratings in 
syndication of 1 percentage point increases the number of seasons by about one.  The 
coefficient for Syndicated means that a show that is syndicated during the transition 
period is two or three seasons longer than those not syndicated during the transition 
period.  The full effects of the interaction variable Syndicated*Fin-Syn are calculated by 
adding up the coefficients for the Fin-Syn, Syndicated, and Syndicated*Fin-Syn.  
Therefore a show that is syndicated during the Fin-Syn period is about one season longer 
than a show that is not syndicated during the transition period, while a show that is 
syndicated during the Post Fin-Syn period is about the same length as a show that is not 
syndicated during the transition period, which is calculated by adding up the coefficients 
for Post Fin-Syn, Syndicated, and Syndicated*Post Fin-Syn.   
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 Finally the change between the Fin-Syn and Post Fin-Syn periods in the length of 
a show that has been syndicated is calculated.  This change is about 1 to 2 seasons and is 
significant at the 5% level for 4 of the 6 regressions.  This supports the hypothesis that 
programs headed to or in syndication were cut short in first-run during the Post Fin-Syn 
period.  
Conclusions 
 This paper proposes that the removal of the Financial Interest and Syndication 
Rules in 1995 changed the incentives for the networks to air more reality programming 
even if these programs are less popular and receive lower ratings than dramatic programs.  
This hypothesis is evaluated using a model borrowed from Wildman and Robinson (1995) 
and a profit maximization model using one network as well as a stock and flow model to 
help explain the timing of the shift.   
The Wildman and Robinson model shows that if a network wanted to withhold a 
show from syndication that it may be more profitable to make a show with a lower value 
in syndication that costs less to make, even if audiences value that show less in the first 
run than a show which has a higher value in syndication.  This would make audiences 
worse off.  The next model shows explicitly that if a network had monopoly power, the 
network would in fact produce fewer shows with a high syndication value.   
An analysis of the fall schedules for the three major networks reveals that the 
mean percentage of reality programming on during prime time is significantly different 
before and after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked.  This supports the hypothesis that the 
rules gave the networks the incentives such that they increased the reality programming 
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that they aired, now showing more games shows, reality shows, and news magazines.  In 
addition, the regressions used to estimate the changes in the average length of a 
syndicated program shows that there is a significant change in the length of these 
programs between the Fin-Syn and Post Fin-Syn periods.  This change supports the 
hypothesis that the networks shorten the length of the syndicated shows that they air 
during prime time. 
Considering that the evidence found here does support the theory that the major 
networks may be taking advantage of their market power in the syndication market and 
that it affects not only the syndication market but also the prime time market as well.  The 
potential welfare effects in both of these markets should be evaluated to determine if 
there is a net loss to society.  The potential welfare loss in the syndication market would 
stem from a reduced quantity of programs and/or seasons of programs available for 
syndication.  While in the prime time market the welfare loss would stem from lower 
viewer satisfaction and potentially lower advertising revenues.  If there is a net loss to 
society, a policy change should be considered to help correct this welfare loss and 
maximize social welfare. 
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Appendix A 
Market Structure Diagrams 1970 to 1995 (Fin-Syn Era) 
I. First Run Market 
 
II. Off-Network Syndication Market 
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Appendix B 
Market Structure Diagrams 1995 to Present (Post Fin-Syn Era) 
I. First Run Market 
 
II. Syndication Market 
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